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California v. LaRue: the Twenty-First

Amendment as a Preferred Power
Robert D. Kamenshine*
A number of recent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced
state regulatory power and have accorded renewed emphasis to the
values of federalism. Some of these decisions, for example, have
reinterpreted narrowly the scope of constitutional guarantees in the
area of criminal justice.' Others have drawn the distinction between
cases addressing individual rights and those concerned with the
allocation of economic resources in order to reject attempts under
the equal protection and due process clauses to reform areas of
social legislation.2 The use of these two basic analytical schemes can
best be illustrated by considering briefly two recent Supreme Court3
decisions. In San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez
the Court upheld a scheme of school financing that created economic inequality among school districts. The Court found that
while education was a vital social concern,4 it "is not among the
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution
.. . [nor is there] any basis for saying that it is implicitly so
protected." 5 In contrast to Rodriguez, and despite the absence of
any clear constitutional directive, the Court in Roe v. Wade6 held
that a woman's right to seek an abortion was an element of privacy
embodied in the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause.7 That Wade pertained to individual rights8
whereas Rodriguez concerned mere allocation of economic re* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; B.A. 1961, College of the City
of New York; J.D. 1964, Columbia Law School; LL.M. 1967, Harvard Law School.
1. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (sixth amendment); Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (fifth amendment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222

(1971) (fifth amendment).
2. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397

U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare).
3. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4. Id. at 30.
5. Id. at 35.
6. 410 U.S. 113, petition for rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
7. Id. at 153 (majority opinion by Blackmun, J.) and 170 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36
(1973).
8. 410 U.S. at 152-56.
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sources, 9 supplied the principal factor requiring different results in
these two cases.
A recent Supreme Court decision, California v. LaRue,"' has
injected a third analytical approach allowing deference to state regulation even in cases involving individual rights. In LaRue the
Court sustained regulations of the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control forbidding bars and night clubs -holding liquor licenses from offering certain types of live performance and
films." Clearly, first amendment freedom was involved. The Court,
however, did not resort to reinterpreting the protection afforded by
this amendment as a means of sustaining the state regulation; instead it held that the twenty-first amendment" grants the states an
otherwise unavailable power to curtail first amendment rights. The
LaRue Court employed the significant concept that legislation
adopted pursuant to a particular power retains its normal presumption of validity despite its prima facie infringement of individual
9. 411 U.S. at 35.
10. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). Liquor licensees and dancers at premises operated by licensees
had sought a declaratory judgment invalidating certain regulations promulgated by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. See note 11 infra.
11. The following kinds of performances were prohibited:
(a) The performance of acts, or simulated acts, of 'sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which are prohibited by law';
(b) The actual or simulated 'touching, caressing or fondling on the breast, buttocks, anus or genitals';
(c) The actual or simulated 'displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva or genitals';
(d) The permitting by a licensee of 'any person to remain in or upon the licensed
premises who exposes to public view any portion of his or her genitals or anus'; and, by
a companion section,
(e) The displaying of films or pictures depicting acts a live performance of which
was prohibited by the regulations quoted above. Rules 143.3 and 143.4.
409 U.S. at 111-12.
In footnote number 2, the court continued: "In addition to the regulations held unconstitutional by the court below, appellees originally challenged Rule 143.2 prohibiting topless
waitresses, Rule 143.3(2) requiring certain entertainers to perform on a stage at a distance
away from customers, and Rule 143.5 prohibiting any entertainment that violated local
ordinances. At oral argument in that court they withdrew their objections to these rules,
conceding 'that topless waitresses are not within the protection of the First Amendment; that
local ordinances must be independently challenged depending upon their content; and that
the requirement that certain entertainers must dance on a stage is not invalid.' 326 F. Supp.
348, 350-51." 409 U.S. at 111-12. See Escheat, Inc. v. Pierstorff, 354 F. Supp. 1120, 1123-24
(W.D. Wis. 1973), and Paladino v. City of Omaha, 471 F.2d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1972), relying
on LaRue in sustaining prohibitions on topless and other nude entertainment.
12. U.S. CONST., amend. XXI, § 2 provides:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited.
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rights. Accordingly, it represents a new position of deference to state
regulatory power and is inconsistent with the established principle
that such infringements of individual rights create a presumption
of unconstitutionality.,3
While the twenty-first amendment rationale of LaRue appears
to pose a threat to certain individual rights, tliat amendment has
been recognized by at least one state supreme court as a legitimate
vehicle for combating racial discrimination in private clubs' 4 -an
area of discrimination generally regarded as beyond the reach of
government and probably involving fundamental rights of association and privacy. Because of the dual potential of the state power
found in the twenty-first amendment and the questionable desirability of the use of that power, this article evaluates the LaRue
decision, explores its unusual twenty-first amendment rationale,
considers alternative approaches the Court might have employed,
and assesses the decision's future impact. Secondly, the article considers the capacity of the state-with or without LaRue-to curtail
discriminatory membership policies of private organizations and
includes a discussion of the related rights of privacy and association.
I.

THE LaRue DECISION

While Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in LaRue conceded
that the challenged regulations prohibited on their face some performances which were "within the scope of constitutional protection
of freedom of expression,"'" it declined to find the regulations void
for overbreadth. The performances in question had not been forbidden absolutely but simply excluded from establishments serving
liquor.'" Since the twenty-first amendment conferred "something
more than the normal state authority" under the police power,
"there was an added presumption of validity" which precluded the
finding of a first amendment violation. 7 Accordingly, the Court
13. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
14. B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607 (Me. 1972) (State of Maine's
denial of liquor license to racially discriminating private club sustained against equal protection, associational, and privacy claims), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 924 (1973).
15. 409 U.S. at 118. "[These regulations . ..would proscribe some forms of visual
presentation that would not be found obscene under Roth and subsequent decisions of this
Court. . . .But we do not believe that the state regulatory authority in this case was limited
to either dealing with the problem it confronted within the limits of our decisions as to
obscenity, or in accordance with the limits prescribed for dealing with some forms of communicative conduct in United States v. O'Brien, [391 U.S. 367 (1968)]." Id. at 116.
16. Id. at 118.
17. Id. at 114, 118.
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found rational and therefore valid the Beverage Control Department's proscription of sale of liquor by the drink simultaneously
with lewd or naked performances because such performances tended
to induce commission of various sex offenses.18
Noting that the applicable principle in LaRue was the same as
that permitting a state to prohibit liquor from being sold in book
stores or within a certain distance of a church, 9 Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion further elaborated the idea that the twenty-first
amendment conferred a broad power to specify the times, places,
and circumstances under which liquor may be dispensed. 2 Any
implication, however, that the twenty-first amendment overrode
any other relevant provisions of the Constitution was disclaimed.2 1
The three dissenting opinions rejected the view that the twentyfirst amendment permits dilution of first amendment rights. Justice
Douglas concluded that the district court should have refrained
from hearing the case in order to afford the California courts the
opportunity to eliminate the overbreadth of the regulations. 21 Justice Brennan determined that by requiring the licensee to forego
first amendment rights, the regulations placed an unconstitutional
condition on the granting of a liquor license.? Justice Marshall
adopted both the overbreadth 4 and unconstitutional conditions rationales 2 and stressed that there must be a uniform approach in
evaluating the exercise of any power against the limitations of the
first amendment. 21 Since nothing in the legislative history of the
twenty-first amendment suggested that Congress had intended to
curtail first amendment rights, 27 Marshall concluded that under the
applicable compelling interest test, a rational basis for linking certain forms of entertainment to commission of sex crimes would not
28
sustain the Beverage Control Department's regulations.
A.

LaRue's Twenty-first Amendment Rationale

Section two of the twenty-first amendment is the only presently
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

118.
119.
120.
120, n.*.
122-23.
123.
123-33.
136-37.
135.
134-35.
130-33.
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operative portion of the Constitution which the Supreme Court has
construed as granting power to the states. 29 As such, it is unique in
a federal system in which enumerated powers are delegated to the
federal government and those not delegated are reserved, subject to
constitutional limitations, to the states. The twenty-first amendment decisions referring to "power" 3 must be viewed, however, in
the context of the amendment's language, its legislative history, and
the facts of the cases. Section two of the amendment is phrased
simply in terms of prohibiting interstate shipment of liquor into a
state in violation of its laws. Legislative history reveals that the
purpose of section two was to ensure that, after the elimination of
national prohibition, states could effectively exercise their police
powers over intoxicating liquors free from any inhibition flowing
from the Constitution's commerce 31 or export-import 32 clauses.3
Thus, while the Supreme Court's decisions speak of state "power"
under the twenty-first amendment, they would more accurately
refer to a "right" to exercise the state's normal police power unrestrained by certain otherwise operative portions of the Constitution. 4
These otherwise operative portions have historically been those
regulating the relationship of the states' police powers to those powers delegated to Congress, rather than those protecting the liberty
of the individual against state encroachment. For example, in the
first significant twenty-first amendment decision, State Board of
Equalizationv. Young's Market,35 the Court examined the constitutionality of a California license fee required for the importation of
beer into the state. Recognizing that the twenty-first amendment
prevented the normal impact of the commerce clause, the Court
held that since the state had the power to prohibit absolutely the
importation of beer, it logically could exercise that power to a lesser
29. The eighteenth amendment, repealed by the twenty-first, granted Congress and the
states concurrent power to enforce prohibition. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2.
30. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42 (1966);

United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936). For a summary of the judicial history of
the amendment see Comment, The Concept of State Power Under the Twenty-First
Amendment, 40 TENN. L. Rv.465, 473-83 (1973).
31. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
32. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl.2.
33. See Justice Marshall's LaRue dissent, 409 U.S. at 134; Comment, supra note 30, at
466-73.
34. See Norman's On The Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1018-19 (3d Cir.
1971).
35. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).

1040

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

extent by imposing a heavy fee on beer imports. 6 The Young's
Market Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the fee
since the classification drawing a line between imported intoxicating liquors and liquors brewed within the state was specifically established by the twenty-first amendment.3 The Court, however,
disclaimed explicitly any implication that the amendment insulated state liquor regulation from all constitutional restraints."
Subsequent to Young's Market, the Court considered other
equal protection and due process attacks on state liquor regulations,
but these attacks occurred almost entirely in the area of economic
regulation. 39 The rational basis approach utilized by the Court to
reject such attacks in these cases was no different from that which
the Court has applied in other economic regulation cases not involving liquor regulation. 0 Significantly, only three decisions prior to
LaRue arguably might fall within the individual rights classification, but these decisions provide no support for the LaRue majority's position. In Goesaert v. Cleary," the Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to a statute permitting women to serve as bartenders only if they were the wife or daughter of a male owner. The
Court did not perceive the case as involving an individual's right to
work at a lawful job,4 2 nor did it consider that classification based
upon sex might demand an extra degree of scrutiny. 3 Rather, the
case was regarded purely as one of economic regulation. While Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion alluded to the twenty-first
amendment and the long history of liquor regulation," the opinion
36. Id. at 63.
37. Id. at 64.
38. Id.
39. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 46-50 (1966). See, e.g.,
Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
40. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423-25 (1952).
41. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).

42. See W.

GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS

105-51

(1956).
43. Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973).
44. "The Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots, and the regulation of the liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most untrammeled of legislative powers.
Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a bar. This is so
despite the vast changes in the social and legal position of women. The fact that women may
now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now
indulge in the vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing
a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic.
See the Twenty-First Amendment and Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131." 335 U.S. at 465-66
(emphasis supplied).
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principally involved application of the extreme rational basis approach characteristic of its author.'5 There is no basis for inferring
that Justice Frankfurter would have applied any closer scrutiny to
a state statute that was enacted solely on the basis of the police
power and regulating the ability of women to work in commercial
laundries."
The second individual rights case involving the twenty-first
amendment is Wisconsin v. Constantineau,41 referred to by Justice
Rehnquist in his LaRue opinion." In Constantineau,the Court held
violative of due process a statute providing for the public posting,
without notice or an opportunity to be heard, of names of persons
who engaged in excessive drinking. 49 Noting that the "police power
of the states over intoxicating liquors was extremely broad even
prior to the twenty-first amendment," the Court nevertheless saw
the only issue in the case as whether the designation of the petitioner as an "excessive drinker" would constitute such a stigma or
badge of disgrace that due process required a hearing. This is the
normal focus of inquiry in any similar due process case.5 1 Finally,
in Moose Lodge v. Irvis,5 2 the Court determined that enforcement
of a state liquor licensing law should be enjoined as violative of
equal protection insofar as it required a private club to comply with
its racially discriminatory constitution and by-laws.5 3 The Court
expressed no concern that the presence of this requirement in a state
liquor statute undermined in any way the applicability of the equal
protection clause. Accordingly, consideration of relevant Supreme
Court decisions reveals no principle requiring that the Court refrain
from close scrutiny of liquor regulations touching upon individual
rights.
Additionally, lower court decisions do not support the existence
of such a principle. For example, in Hornsby v. A llen 54 an unsuccess45.

"Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar

by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without

such protecting oversight. This Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief by
the Michigan legislature. If it is entertainable, as we think it is, Michigan has not violated
its duty to afford equal protection of its laws." 335 U.S. at 466.
46. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
48. 409 U.S. at 115.
49. 400 U.S. at 434-35.

50. Id. at 436.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
407 U.S. at 179.
326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).

1042

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

ful liquor license applicant alleged that she had been denied due
process and equal protection by the arbitrary refusal to issue her a
license. In reversing the federal district court's order of dismissal,
the Fifth Circuit observed that ". . . states do not escape the operation of the 14th Amendment in dealing with intoxicating beverages
by reason of the 21st Amendment. . . . [A]lthough a state may,
under the 21st Amendment, discriminate against imports of intoxicating beverages, the Amendment does not confer any other powers
... ."5 Another lower court decision making this point even more
clearly is Krauss v. Sacramento Inn,5" involving a female bartender
statute identical to that considered many years before in Goesaert.
The plaintiff raised no equal protection claim but instead relied on
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 The court determined that the
twenty-first amendment insulated the state's regulation from commerce clause restrictions and consequently from the effects of the
federal civil rights statute enacted under the commerce power."8 As
to the argument that the amendment was inapplicable because the
statute bore no reasonable relation to the regulation of the liquor
traffic, the court stated that this result was precluded by Goesaert.'9
It was noted, however, that this finding of twenty-first amendment
validity would not have insulated the statute from a fourteenth
amendment challenge.60 Similarly, the lower court decision in
LaRue' clearly addressed the twenty-first amendment argument.
Relying on the Constantineaudecision, the court reasoned that if
the interest of the state cannot override the due process clause "it
certainly cannot override the first amendment, which has always
55. Id. at 609. But see Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). "While state regulation of traffic in liquor is of course subject to certain
limits imposed by the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as by the Commerce Clause, nevertheless the state's regulatory power in this
area is far broader than in the case of an ordinary lawful business essential to the conduct of
human affairs." 317 F. Supp. at 600.
However, this statement was made in the context of finding that the defendant liquor
licensee's refusal of service to women constituted unlawful state action because of the state's
"significant" involvement in the licensee's business.
56. 314 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
57. Id. at 173.
58. Id. at 178.
59. Id. at 177.
60. Id. at 177, n.5 and accompanying text. Compare United States v. Cantrell, 307 F.
Supp. 259 (E.D. La. 1969) (striking down a racially motivated ordinance excluding servicemen from bars).
61. 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
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received a 'preferred position' among the liberties granted to all of
62
US."

LaRue's principal defect is its reliance on the twenty-first
amendment to create in the area of liquor regulation a super police
power, unrestrained to some extent by constitutional safeguards of
individual liberty. LaRue stands apartfrom the prior twenty-first
amendment decisions such as Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter 3 that simply insulated state liquor regulation from normal restrictions emanating from the delegation of certain powers to
Congress. In Hostetter,a case concerning a challenge to a New York
law requiring that liquor prices be "no higher than the lowest price"
anywhere in the country, reliance on the twenty-first amendment
power was critical. Although the police power alone might have been
inadequate to sustain the legislation, given the burden on interstate
commerce that the statute created,64 the state's goal of eliminating
"discrimination against and disadvantage of customers" was held
properly to be rationally related to the twenty-first amendment, and
any limitations flowing from the commerce clause were overriden.15
In the case of the LaRue regulations, however, no comparable commerce clause vulnerability is present. Here the twenty-first amendment adds nothing to the regulatory power which the state otherwise possesses. Concededly, a rational relationship may exist between the state's appropriate objective under its police power or the
twenty-first amendment-preventing otherwise illegal sexual acts
from occurring in and near bars and nightclubs-and the regulation
of entertainment in those establishments." The issue of whether the
first amendment forbids such regulations should, nevertheless, remain distinct. The court in Krauss emphasized this precise point
when it differentiated between the question whether a particular
regulation was within the scope of the state's regulatory power and
the question whether the exercise of that power was consistent with
the fourteenth amendment."
62. Id. at 357. See also Bruno v. City of Kenosha, 333 F. Supp. 726, 729-30 (E.D. Wis.
1971), vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct. 2222 (1973).
63. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
64. Id. at 41.
65. Id. at 42-43. Due process and equal protection arguments were rejected on traditional deference to legislative judgment grounds. Id. at 46-51.
66. The Court rejected the contention that ". . . the same results could have been
accomplished by requiring that patrons already well on the way to intoxication be excluded
from the licensed premises." There was said to be a ". . . wide latitude as to choice of means
to accomplish a permissible end ....
" 409 U.S. 116 (1972).
67. Unfortunately, LaRue is not the only recent instance in which the Supreme Court
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Three Alternative Approaches to LaRue
1.

Locational Restraint

Both the LaRue majority and Justice Stewart's concurring
opinions emphasize that there was only a locational prohibition, as
opposed to an absolute prohibition, of the performances -described
by the California regulation. Numerous decisions have sustained
reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of the exercise
of first amendment rights, and seem to offer an alternative rationale
that could easily supplant the twenty-first amendment as a basis for
the LaRue result. Two key differences between LaRue and other
speech regulation cases, however, make reliance on a theory emphasizing locational restraint tenuous. First, the decisions sustaining
reasonable regulation have related to the so-called public forum, not
has subsumed a first amendment issue into a discussion of the scope of a power. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court considered the first amendment right of
scholars in the United States to hear, speak, and debate in person with an alien Marxist
scholar who sought a non-immigrant visa to enter the country. The Attorney General had
denied a waiver of the prohibition on entry into the United States of aliens who advocate
Communism. In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court recognized a first amendment
right to receive information, but declined to balance this right against the plenary power of
Congress to make policies and rules for the exclusion of aliens. 408 U.S. at 762-65. As in
LaRue, only a rational relationship of means and legitimate ends was demanded. 408 U.S.
at 770. The Court's approach in LaRue and Mandel might be termed a "preferred" powers
analogue to the concept of preferred freedoms. See United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Legislation rationally related to the subject matter of these
powers is accorded a presumption of legitimacy despite the fact that such legislation arguably
limits first amendment or other constitutional rights. This analytical short circuiting is dangerous to the continued vitality of these rights. The issues of content of power and limitation
on power should be kept distinct in all cases, regardless of the power on which reliance is
placed. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 65 (1957), addressing the ability of Congress to specify court-martial trials in criminal cases involving the wives
of U.S. servicemen accompanying their husbands overseas, makes this clear:
[It is] useful to break down the issue before us into two questions: First, is there a
rational connection between the trial of these army wives by court-martial and the power
of Congress to make rules for the governance of the land and naval forces; in other words,
is there any initial power at all? Second, if there is such a rational connection, to what
extent does this statute, though reasonably calculated to subserve an enumerated power,
collide with other express limitations on congressional power ....
354 U.S. at 70.
In United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), concerning the legitimacy under the first
amendment of a congressional exercise of the war power, the Court stressed that "the phrase
'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its ambit." 389 U.S. at 263. As the Robel Court
recognized, specific instances in which the war power is exercised often involve exigencies
which form a compelling basis for overriding constitutional rights. Such a basis, nevertheless,
must be demonstrated in each instance in which the power is invoked. LaRue and Mandel,
by focusing on the particular sources of governmental power, unwisely allow the evasion of
such a showing.
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to a private place of business. 8 Secondly, and perhaps more important, an essential element in the public-forum cases is the requirement that regulations not discriminate on the basis of the content
of the proposed speech." In LaRue the content of the speech was the
essence of the regulation. To rely, therefore, on the locational restraint doctrine to regulate the content of speech would be to ignore
a basic tenet of that doctrine.
2.

Conditional Restraint

Related to the locational argument is the contention that the
legislation in fact does not prohibit speech at all, but merely conditions the continuance of a liquor license on compliance with the
entertainment regulations. As emphasized by the Marshall and
Brennan dissents, this approach collides with the proposition that
receipt of a governmental benefit may not be conditioned upon the
relinquishment of a constitutional right." Despite the appeal of the
unconstitutional conditions rationale, there are circumstances in
which a relationship with the government may justify a restriction
of otherwise available constitutional rights.7 1 In LaRue the relationship involves a license which permits dispensing of alcohol, a potent
drug whose consumption may make criminal behavior, including
sexual offenses, more likely.72 In this context, the California regulations perhaps could be justified as designed to limit performances
68. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (state capital grounds);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (public street).
69. See, e.g., Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 556-58 (1965).
70. Less than a year before its LaRue decision the Court stated:
For at least a quarter century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has
no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not act. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), cited in Justice Marshall's LaRue dissent,
409 U.S. at 136-37.
71. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S.
Ct. 2880, 2890-91 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2913 (1973); Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1439,
1448 (1968); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARv. L. Ray. 1595, 1600 (1960).
72. See U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, Task Force Report: Drunkenness, 13, 13-14, 41 (1967). LaRue noted the occurrence of the following crimes: "Prostitution occurred in and around such licensed premises,
and involved some of the female dancers. Indecent exposure to young girls, attempted rape,
rape itself, and assaults on police officers took place on or immediately adjacent to such
premises." 409 U.S. at 111.
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which might provoke criminal acts in an audience whose normal
self-restraint would be diminished. Although Justice Marshall's
LaRue dissent, citing the Report of the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography, observes that "the empirical link between sexrelated entertainment and the criminal activity popularly associated with it has never been proved and, indeed, has now largely
been discredited, 7' 3 the studies cited make no allowance for the
possible effect of intoxication on reaction to such entertainment.
While this rationale offers a plausible basis for the California regulations, it was not, despite implications to the contrary in the LaRue
majority's opinion, relied on by the Beverage Control Department. 4
3.

Overbreadth and Related Standards

To answer the dissenters' overbreadth argument, the LaRue
majority cited the unusually broad power of the states under the
twenty-first amendment. They carefully disclaimed, however, any
contention that the twenty-first amendment places all entertainment in establishments holding liquor licenses outside the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court then conceded only grudgingly that performances prohibited by the California regulations would ordinarily have been entitled to first amendment protection. Justice Rehnquist pointedly observed that the per73. 409 U.S. at 131. See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (Marshall,
J.), finding "little empirical basis" for this link and emphasizing that, at least in the case of
private consumption of information, crime must be prevented by education and punishment
for violations. But see Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2635 (1973) in which
the Court cited the views of the Obscenity Commission's 3 dissenting members: "The HillLink Minority Report. . . indicates there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene
material and crime."
74. 409 U.S. at 111. Quoting from the district court's description of testimony presented
to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "the story that
unfolded was a sordid one, primarily relating to sexual conduct between dancers and customers." 409 U.S. at 111. These words originally appeared, however, in the district court's explanation of the Department's rule, unchallenged by plaintiffs, requiring "certain entertainers to
perform on a stage at least six feet away from any customer." 326 F. Supp. at 352. Furthermore, it has been noted that "the rules to which objection was withdrawn [by the plaintiffs]
would have prohibited most if not all of the incidents of legitimate concern to the Department
referred to by Justice Rehnquist." Comment, The Concept of State Power Under the Twentyfirst Amendment, 40 TENN. L. Ray. 465, 486 (1973). Significantly, the district court went on
to state that "[a] fair reading of the transcript of the hearings requires the conclusion that
the Department not only desired to prohibit sexual conduct between dancers and customers,
but wanted to establish a set of rules which would circumvent United States and California
Supreme Court decisions relating to obscenity. . . . 326 F. Supp. at 352. See also California
v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 111, 126 n.4 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out the district
court's finding that the Board's purpose was impermissibly based on mere hostility to the
right asserted).
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formances in question "partake more of gross sexuality than of communication" and are hardly "the constitutional equivalent of a performance by a scantily clad ballet troupe." 5 The language reflects
the willingness of some justices-a willingness expressed in several
opinions prior to LaRue-to permit state enforcement of more extensive anti-obscenity controls" and to afford less protection to
speech deemed to be of marginal social utility." Although the dissenters claimed that the Beverage Department's regulations could
be used to prohibit the showing of a serious film such as Ulysses"5
or the performance of a Shakespearean play,'7 the factual context
prompting the adoption of the regulations made such a strained
construction appear highly unlikely."0 If the theoretical risk to such
expression ever became a reality, there would be time enough for the
Court to respond.
Several members of the LaRue majority previously had criticized "excessive" reliance on the overbreadth doctrine," and given
their perception that the regulations proscribed primarily nonprotected expression, and their views that any expression protected in
this case was marginal in character, 2 there may have been little
75. 409 U.S. at 118. In a footnote, the opinion stated:
Because of the posture of this case, we have necessarily dealt with the regulations on
their face, and have found them to be valid. The admonition contained in the Court's
opinion in Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 52 (1966), is equally in point here:
"Although it is possible that specific future applications of [the statute] may engender
concrete problems of constitutional dimension, it will be time enough to consider any
such problems when they arise. We deal here only with the statute on its face. And we
hold that, so considered, the legislation is constitutionally valid."
Id. at 119 n.5.
76. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 902 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 903 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. See Hartstein v. Missouri, 404 U.S. 988 (1971) (Burger, C.J., Blackmun & White,
JJ., dissenting); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970) (Burger, C.J., Blackmun & Harlan,
JJ., dissenting).
78. "The regulations thus treat on the same level a serious movie such as 'Ulysses' and
a crudely made 'stag film'. They ban not only obviously pornographic photographs, but also
great sculpture from antiquity." 409 U.S. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. "It is conceivable that a licensee might produce in a garden served by him a
play-Shakespearean perhaps or one in a more modem setting-in which, for example, 'fondling' in the sense of the rules appears." 409 U.S. at 121 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. The focus of the Department's concern was "the progrsssion in a few years time from
'topless' dancers to 'bottomless' dancers and other forms of 'live entertainment' in bars and
nightclubs which it licensed." 409 U.S. at 110.
81. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 907-08 (1972) (dissenting opinion of Powell,
J., in which Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., joined); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 532
(1972) (Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., dissenting); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
617 (1971) (Burger, C.J., White, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
82. The Court has recognized that there is material which borders on the obscene and
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impetus to apply the overbreadth principles. Thus, even without the
majority's reliance on the twenty-first amendment, the overbreadth
attack could have been rejected on the basis that the regulations
posed no substantial risk of deterring the exercise of protected
speech. Significantly, shortly after LaRue the Court expressly curtailed the use of the overbreadth rationale by adopting the "substantial" overbreadth test. 3 In applying the new test, the Court
explained that "particularly where conduct and not merely speech
is involved . . . overbreadth of a statute must not only be real but
substantial as well, [furthermore, it must be] judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep . . . and may be cured
through a case-by-case analysis."84
Alternatively, the Court could have sustained the regulations
by revising its standards governing permissible control of sexually
oriented material under the first amendment. In a cluster of 5-4
decisions rendered at the close of the 1972-73 term,8" the Court
adopted this approach, clearing the way for vigorous state and local
attacks on obscenity. A major facet of these decisions was their
discarding explicitly the "utterly without redeeming social value"
test86 in favor of one which asks "whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."8 The
court, citing LaRue,8" observed that "[s]ex and nudity may not be
exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited in places of
which may be protected in some contexts and not in others. See Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2634 n.4 (1973); Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475 (1965);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957). Moreover, where conduct is involved in
the expression of ideas, the Court has recognized a greater latitude for regulation. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
83. United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S. Ct.
2880, 2898 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2915-18 (1973). These decisions
involved declaratory judgment actions testing the constitutionality of the Hatch Act and a
similar Oklahoma law restricting political activity by governmental employees.
84. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2918 (1973).
85. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S.
Ct. 2628 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665
(1973); United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680
(1973).
86. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (opinion of Brennan, J., in
which Warren, C.J., & Fortas, J., joined). In Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967),
involving a per curiam disposition of 3 obscenity cases, the Court noted 3 legitimate state
interests in the regulation of obscenity: protection of juveniles, prevention of assaults on
individual privacy, and prevention of pandering. Subsequent decisions upsetting obscenity
convictions were rendered on a per curiam basis citing Redrup. See Miller v. California, 93
S. Ct. 2607, 2614 n.3 (1973).
87. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).
88. Id. at 2616 n.8.
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public accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can be
exhibited or sold without limit in such public places." 9 The citation
to LaRue is rather odd given the LaRue majority's concession that
a portion of the performances proscribed by the California regulations was constitutionally privileged. Rather than demanding "substantial overbreadth" or redefining obscenity, LaRue had held that
the twenty-first amendment permitted the state to impinge on a
liquor licensee's right to offer entertainment that ordinarily would
be barely within the protection of the first amendment. Coupling
the LaRue holding with subsequent overbreadth and obscenity decisions, it becomes clear that Justice Rehnquist's twenty-first amendment rationale merely camouflaged narrowed views of substantive
first amendment rights." Given the explicit adoption of these views
in recent decisions, it might be thought that LaRue's twenty-first
amendment rationale will have little future impact. There are, however, some contexts in which this may not be true.
C. Future Impact of LaRue
In Cook v. Peto,1 a three-judge district court invalidated liquor
control regulations that permitted enforcement officers to confiscate
allegedly obscene materials from a licensee's premises without a
prior hearing to determine the obscenity issue. 2 While the district
court's decision appeared to be clearly mandated by prior Supreme
Court holdings,93 the Supreme Court vacated the Peto judgment on
appeal and remanded for further consideration in light of LaRue. 4
Shortly after taking this action, the Court confronted another procedural due process liquor licensing question in City of Kenosha v.
89. Id. at 2615-16.
90. The Court in Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), provided "a few plain
examples of what a state statute could define for regulation . . . (a) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id. at 2615. These examples were strikingly similar
to the regulations sustained in LaRue. Note 11 supra.The Court's outlining of the valid state
law immediately was followed by reference to LaRue. See text supra at 1048-49.
91. 339 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Ohio 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (remanded for
reconsideration in light of LaRue).
92. The regulations provided that no permit holder "shall knowingly or willfully allow
in . . . his . . . premises . . . any indecent, profane, or obscene . . . literature, pictures, or
advertising materials . . . ... Id. at 1301-02.
93. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965);
Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
94. 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
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Bruno. 5 In that case, the city had refused to renew several retail
liquor licenses on the ground that the licensees had permitted nude
entertainment. Relying on recent Supreme Court decisions, the district court held that since the hearing which had been held prior to
the denial of renewal was "legislative" in character, that hearing
violated due process. 6 The Supreme Court, in addition to remanding for consideration of a significant jurisdictional matter," directed
a reappraisal of the due process issue. It pointed out that the district
court had not had the benefit of the Court's decisions in Board of
Regents v. Roth" and Perry v. Sindermann,99 delineating the scope
of the property and liberty protected by due process. ' As to
LaRue's possible impact, the Court stated:
There we held again that while the Twenty-first Amendment did not abrogate
a requirement of procedural due process, [citing Constantineau] it did grant
the States broad authority over the distribution and sale of liquor. We also
held that regulations prohibiting the sale of liquor by the drink on premises
where there were nude but not necessarily obscene performances were facially
constitutional. lot

It would be unfortunate if LaRue's twenty-first amendment
rationale were relied on to deprive liquor licensees of due process
safeguards. In both Peto and Bruno first amendment rights were at
stake, and in such cases the Supreme Court would adhere normally
to stringent requirements of due process. The Roth decision, cited
by the Court in its remand of Bruno, contained the following observation: "When a State would directly impinge upon interests in free
speech . . . this Court has on occasion held that opportunity for a
fair adversary hearing must precede the action, whether or not the
speech . . . interest is clearly protected under substantive First
'10 2
Amendment standards."
In Escheat,Inc. v. Pierstorff,1 °3 a post LaRue decision, a threejudge district court confronted the situation of revocation of a liquor
95. 93 S. Ct. 2222 (1973).
96. 333 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Wis. 1971). The opinion of the 3-judge district court is
reported as Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43, 47-49 (1972).
97. The Court determined that a city was not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even
where only equitable relief is sought. Thus the district court erroneously had concluded that
it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. On remand, the district court was to consider
whether it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 93 S.Ct. at 2225-27.
98. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
99. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
100. 93 S.Ct. at 2227.
101. Id.
102. 408 U.S. at 575 n.14.
103. 354 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
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license for permitting nude entertainment. The court, finding that
the due process standards set forth in Bruno had been fulfilled,' 4
went on to consider the claim that where a license revocation significantly affects the licensee's capacity to present performances arguably covered by the first amendment, there must be judicial review
initiated by the revoking authority.' 5 Finding that even after LaRue
the entertainment in question might be entitled to first amendment
protection,'0 the court granted a preliminary injunction against the
07
license revocation.'
LaRue's determination that the twenty-first amendment permits the states to control otherwise marginally protected expression
does not sanction elimination of the procedural due process standards safeguarding protected expression. For example, it is inconceivable that a liquor license could be revoked without a hearing on
the grounds that a political satirist appearing at a night club had
used some mildly off-color language.
Nothing in the recent cluster of obscenity decisions expressly
indicated that the Court would be as ready to relax procedural
safeguards for first amendment rights as it was to redefine and
reduce their substance.' 8 In fact, two recent Supreme Court decisions have specifically addressed procedural problems. Emphasizing its concern with prior restraint of the right of expression, the
Court in Roaden v. Kentucky' 9 invalidated a warrantless seizure of
an allegedly obscene film incident to arresting the film's exhibitor."'
In the second decision, Heller v. New York,"' the Court reaffirmed
but distinguished the two major prior decisions"' concerning seizure
of allegedly obscene materials."' Although there had been no prior
adversary hearing, the Court sustained seizure of a copy of a film
where the seizure was solely for evidentiary purposes."' The opinion
emphasized the facts that a neutral judge had viewed the film in
its entirety before issuing a warrant, that a prompt adversary hear104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
Warrant
113.

Id.at 1124 n.3.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1125-26.
Id. at 1127.
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2634 (1973).
93 S. Ct. 2796 (1973).
Id. at 2801.
93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973).
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search
of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
93 S. Ct. at 2794.
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ing was available subsequent to the seizure, and that there was no
showing that seizure of one copy of the film prevented its exhibition
prior to a final determination of the obscenity issue."'
Certainly, there is no basis for contending that the Court's curtailment of substantive first amendment protection in the obscenity
area requires or supports a parallel diminution of procedural rights.
If anything, the enhanced zeal of local officials to "clean up" the
community should be restrained by even stricter judicial enforcement of procedural safeguards. Moreover, there is no justification
for a separate set of more lenient procedural rules, sanctioned by the
twenty-first amendment, for use in cases in which liquor regulation
is involved. Even accepting arguendo the validity of the LaRue
rationale, the considerations set forth as providing a rational basis
for greater state control are inoperative in the case of procedural due
process requirements. For example, it is difficult to see what bearing
LaRue can have on the issue in Peto of whether the state may seize
reading materials from a retail liquor establishment solely on the
basis of the ad hoc judgment of the state's liquor agents.
Putting aside the involvement of first amendment rights in the
question of procedural due process for liquor licensees, the issues
that are articulated in the Bruno opinion still must be faced. In
Roth and Sindermann, cited in Bruno, the Court held that a teacher
who did not enjoy de jure or de facto tenure generally had no due
process property right in his position."' The standard applied was
whether the person alleging the property interest has "a legitimate
claim or entitlement to it [arising out] of existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law. 1 1 17 Applying this standard to the case of a liquor licensee, there
is little doubt that the states have created this entitlement through
regulations allowing liquor license suspension or revocation only for
violation of stated rules, and by establishment of objective criteria
for the granting of such licenses.' In the more difficult Bruno situa115. Id. at 2795.
116. 408 U.S. at 576-77; 408 U.S. at 599-600. A hearing would be required if the grounds
for dismissal "might seriously damage [the individual's] standing and associations in his
community" or "[impose] on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities." 408 U.S. at 573. In some circumstances, the grounds for denial, revocation, suspension, or nonrenewal of a liquor license might
be of this character. See statutory provisions cited at note 118, infra.
117. 408 U.S. at 577.
118. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 138, §§ 12-15 (granting of licenses), 23, 23A (suspension of licenses), 30C (termination of licenses), 64 (forfeiture of licenses) (1972); OHIO REv.
CO E ANN. §§ 4301.25-.29 (suspension and cancellation of licenses), 4303.01-.26 (granting of
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tion of nonrenewal, the defacto tenure rationale of Sindermann is
in point since the scheme of liquor regulation would create in the
licensee the reasonable expectation that his business would not be
destroyed absent circumstances similar to those justifying cancellation or suspension. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit had recognized
application of due process to liquor licensing prior to LaRue"' and
has continued to do so notwithstanding that decision.12
The Supreme Court has rejected the kinds of justifications relating to cost and inconvenience which the state might raise in
defense of dispensing with adjudicative hearings in liquor licensing
cases. 121 This trend has gone so far that it is fair to say that only
something approaching a compelling state interest will justify a
denial of procedural due process. 2 The policy determination that
licenses), 4303.271 (renewal of licenses) (Anderson 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.041 (expiration of licenses), 176.05 (granting of licenses), 176.09 (application for licenses), 176.11-12
(revocation of licenses), 176.70 (application and revocation) (1957), as amended in part, Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 176.05, 176.70 (Cum. Supp. 1973). "The stake of the plaintiffs is both their
occupations and their investments for denial of the renewal of a liquor license bars them not
only from selling liquor but substantially impairs the value of their taverns." Misurelli v. City
of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43, 48 (1972). In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), applying the
requirement of procedural due process to suspension of an automobile drivers license, the
Court stated:
Once licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential in the
pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be
taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement
is denominated a "right" or a "privilege."
402 U.S. at 439. See K. DAvis, ADMINsTRATvE LAW § 7.13, at 184-86 (3d ed. 1972). Noting
the trend toward affording procedural due process and condemning those state and lower
federal court decisions denying this right to liquor and other licensees, Davis remarks:
The privilege doctrine has been often applied to licenses concerning alcoholic beverages,
dance halls, pool rooms, theaters, and other kinds of entertainment. The reason, according to the opinions, is that the licensed activity can be constitutionally prohibited. But
no court has ever given a satisfactory explanation of why procedural fairness should be
denied to those whose businesses can be constitutionally prohibited.
Id. at 185.
119. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1964). But see Lewis v. City of Grand
Rapids, 356 F.2d 276, 277 (6th Cir. 1966). Significantly, both these circuit court decisions were
rendered prior to the major Supreme Court procedural due process decisions relied on by the
district court in Bruno.
120. Block v. Thompson, 472 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973).
121. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 (1972); Stanley v. illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 656 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970). For a specific discussion of
these factors in the context of liquor licenses see Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43,
48 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
122. See Vlandis v. Kline, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 2237 (1973) (rejecting state justifications for
application of a continuing conclusive presumption of nonresidency to state university students who were nonresidents at the time of their admission).
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liquor and nude entertainment do not mix certainly does not dictate
the procedure to be followed in deciding whether, for example, a
license should be renewed. Only the unacceptable approach that
automatically credits the state with a compelling interest in enforcing any regulation relating to control of liquor could explain such
results, and this proposition was rejected by the Court in
Constantineau.

HI.

THE LARuE RATIONALE AND PROHIBITIONS OF PRIVATE CLUB DisCRIMINATION

Beyond LaRue's implications regarding state control of expression, the case may offer the possibility of enhanced state power to
discourage discrimination by private clubs holding liquor licenses.
In B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham,'3 a post LaRue decision,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the constitutionality
of requiring a fraternal lodge to observe a nondiscriminatory membership policy as a condition of retaining its liquor license. The
Lodge had argued that "private persons have the [right] . . . to
associate in private with whom they wish however arbitrary their
choices,' ' 2 and that the state's nondiscrimination licensing requirement placed an unconstitutional price upon the exercise of this
constitutional right.1 25 Rejecting these contentions, the court's opinion first noted that no direct prohibition of association was involved.12 Instead, without specific reference to LaRue-decided less
than a week earlier-the court stressed the plenary and untrammeled nature of the state's power to regulate all matters involving
the production and sale of alcoholic beverages. 27 Avoiding a strict
scrutiny approach, the court defined the constitutional issue as
"whether the State requirement bore some rational relationship to
a legitimate state purpose.' 28 Although the court accepted the
premise of the Supreme Court's decision in Moose Lodge v. Irvis
123. 297 A.2d 607 (Me. 1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 924 (1973). In July, 1973,
the B.P.O.E. (Benovolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America,
hereinafter, "Elks") rescinded the "whites-only" clause. The action of the group's Chicago
convention was subject to approval by a majority of the organization's lodges. Citing "legal
pressure" and "changing social attitudes," the Elk's grand exalted ruler stated that he expected approval of the change by October, 1973. Wall Street Journal, July 20, 1973, at 1, col.
3.
124. 297 A.2d at 610.
125. Id. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 75 n.34 (1972).
126. 297 A.2d at 611.
127. Id. at 611-13.
128. Id. at 613.
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that the "club's arbitrary discriminatory membership policy remains private action. . . not subject to the mandates of. . . equal
protection of the laws," it recognized that the question here, however, was "whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State
from making the choice" to condition liquor licenses on nondiscrimination.1 2' The court concluded that it did not. Accordingly, the
court applied the rationality test and found that the state policy had
two rational purposes: (1) eliminating irrational racial restrictions
on the sale of liquor,1 3 and (2) ensuring that the state did not appear
to be condoning and indirectly encouraging invidious discrimination. 31 An appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question.132 Three Justices dissented from this
dismissal but on grounds unrelated to the questions of associational
33
and privacy rights.'
Whether the twenty-first amendment's new role as a preferred
power was of any consequence in the Supreme Court's dismissal is
subject only to speculation.' 34 Unfortunately, the Court has not
dealt definitively with the scope of the constitutional rights of association and privacy and the extent to which they are available to
private organizations that exclude applicants for memberships on
the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin. Some guidelines,
however, are available from decisions that interpret the civil rights
acts, answer questions of state action, or deal with laws conditioning
governmental benefits on nondiscrimination. These decisions will
be explored to assess the value of LaRue as an anti-discrimination
tool.
A.

"Private"Discriminationand the Civil Rights Acts

The public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 expressly excludes "private clubs" from its coverage.' 35 Constitutional questions of association and privacy can arise under the
1964 Act, therefore, only if the statutory exemption is narrower than
the protection the Constitution affords these rights. Since this con129. Id. at 614.
130. Id. at 615.
131. Id. at 615-16.
132. B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924 (1973).
133. The dissent by Justice Douglas, in which Justices Stewart and Blackmun concurred, found a substantial equal protection issue in the Maine statute's exemption for
"organizations which are oriented to a particular religion or which are ethnic in character."
Id. at 924. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
134. See materials cited note 193 infra. See also note 67 supra.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
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tention has not been made, however, the Supreme Court has not
faced this issue. Instead, any constitutional considerations have
been subsumed under discussions of statutory interpretation. 36
Similarly, the Court has not had to confront directly the constitutional issue in cases arising under 42 U.S.C. section 1982, even
37
though that statute contains no express private club exemption.
Although the Court held in Sullivan v. Little Huntington Park3 '
that section 1982 applied to access to a privately organized community park and playground facility, it expressly determined that
a private club was not involved in that case since the park was open
to every white person living in the relevant geographic area.'39 More
recently, in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven RecreationalAssociation,'
the Court expressly disclaimed resolving the private club discrimination issue.'
While the Supreme Court cases involving federal civil rights
legislation have not expressly addressed the constitutional rights of
association and privacy enjoyed by private clubs, some lower federal
courts have considered this problem in dicta. For example, after
determining in Wright v. Cork Club12 that the club was a place of
public accommodation, the court stated that ".

.

. any truly private

organization or association, such as a country club, a social club, a
business partnership, or a political association would be beyond the
bounds of government regulation with regard to membership ... "
Moreover, the court argued, "to allow such a governmental intrusion would violate not only the First Amendment, but the very
essence of the Bill of Rights.' '

3

B. Private Discriminationand the State Action Cases
A second category of decisions discussing the constitutional
implications of discriminatory membership policies consists of cases
in which allegations of unconstitutional state involvement in these
practices have been presented. In Bell v. Maryland,' one of the sit136. For a summary of the criteria employed to determine "private club" status, see
Note, Private Club Discrimination,1970 Wis. L. REv. 595, 596-97.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
138. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
139. Id. at 236.
140. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
141. Id. at 438.
142. 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
143. Id. at 1156-57. See also Wesley v. City of Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga.
1969).
144. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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in trespass cases concerning businesses open to the general public,
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion acknowledged somewhat reluctantly that private clubs are entitled to be bigoted: "Prejudice
and bigotry in any form are regrettable but it is the constitutional
right of every person to close his home or club to any person or to
choose his intimates and business partners solely on the basis of
personal prejudices including race. These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves constitutionally protected liberties."" 5 The more recent case of Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis,'1" distinguished by the Maine court in Ingraham, concerned whether providing a liquor license to a lodge of a fraternal
order which practiced racial discrimination in its membership and
guest policies constituted impermissible state action. The federal
district court had declared invalid the Lodge's license as long as the
lodge-even though a private organization-followed a policy of racial discrimination.'47 Except to the extent that the Pennsylvania
regulations compelled the Lodge to adhere to its own discriminatory
by-laws,"I the Court rejected Irvis's state action claim that the state
liquor licensing procedure provided the requisite state action'49 and
characterized the lodge as "a private social club in a private building.""'5 There was no symbiotic relationship between the club and
the state,'' nor was there any suggestion in the record that the
Pennsylvania liquor statutes and regulations were intended either
overtly or covertly to encourage discrimination.'5 2
The Court's rejection of Irvis's state action claim may have
been based to some degree on an unarticulated belief that a holding
of state action would have resulted in the impairment of important
rights of association and privacy. 5 Justice Douglas's dissenting
opinion, 1- in which Justice Marshall concurred, explicitly dealt
with this concern:
145. Id. at 313. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined in this concurrence.
See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1966).
146. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Irvis had been a guest in the Lodge and was denied service at
the bar because of his race. He conceded that the Lodge was a bona fide private club, but
for its involvement with the Pennsylvania liquor licensing authority. Id. at 171, 179 n.1.
147. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
148. 407 U.S. 177-78.
149. Id. at 177.
150. Id. at 175.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 176.
153. See Note, Private Clubs: Freedom of Association Overlooked In Effort To Guarantee Equal Protection, 23 SYA~cusE L. Rav. 905, 915-16 (1972) (criticizing federal district
court's finding of state action in Moose Lodge).
154. 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972).
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My view of the First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill
of Rights is that they create a zone of privacy which precludes government
from interfering with private clubs and groups. The associational rights which
our system honors permits all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs
to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs
to be established. 55
Subsequently, in Bennett v. Dyer's Chop House, Inc.,'"5 a federal

district court distinguished the Moose Lodge decision on the precise
ground that the lodge had been found to be private. Noting that
Dyer's was not a private club but a corporation for profit open to
the public during all of its business hours,"7 the court concluded
that a restaurant holding a liquor license was acting under color of
state law in enforcing a policy that excluded all female patrons from
the bar and restaurant during certain hours of the day. The finding
of state action rested on "the basis of the control exerted by the
State of Ohio through its Department of Liquor Control and the
relationship between the defendant and this department.""5 8 As did
Justice Douglas in his Moose Lodge dissent, the court predicated its
finding of state action not only on the extensive state control over
liquor licensees but also on the fact that a liquor licensee was the
recipient of a valuable limited monopoly right.159
While the Bennett court focused on the distinction between a
Moose Lodge and a restaurant, it did not elaborate on the distinction's significance. Furthermore, the articulated basis of the contrary Moose Lodge opinion-that "where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have significantly involved
itself with invidious discriminations"'-does not dictate the result
in Bennett. The absence from Bennett of any significant associational or privacy interests is one factor, however, that would both
support and explain the Bennett result.'
155. Id. at 179-80. Justice Douglas nevertheless dissented because there were only a
fixed number of liquor licenses available to private clubs in Pennsylvania, and the quota for
the area in which the Lodge was located had been exhausted. Therefore, he concluded, the
State was "putting the weight of its liquor license, concededly a valued and important
adjunct to a private club, behind racial discrimination." 407 U.S. at 183.
156. 350 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
157. Id. at 155.
158. Id. at 154.
159. Id.
160. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 380 (1967).
161. In Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), Justice Powell's majority
opinion expressly recognized that a determination of state action could involve the balancing
of constitutional rights. The issue in Lloyd was whether a shopping center's handbill distribution ban could be applied constitutionally to anti-war leafletters. A finding of state action
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In a related development subsequent to the Supreme Court's
Moose Lodge decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the Moose Lodge
dining room and bar was a place of public accommodation as to
guests.' Only six days after the LaRue decision, an appeal to the
Supreme Court alleging violations of the Moose Lodge members'
rights of privacy and association was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.'63 Given the basis of the Pennsylvania decision, however, to attribute too much significance to the Supreme
Court's dismissal would be inappropriate. The Pennsylvania court
found that opening Lodge facilities to guests of members, subject
only to the limitation that the guests be Caucasian, constituted a
limited waiver of the Lodge's interests in privacy and exclusiveness
of association.' 4 The Pennsylvania court's opinion in no way attempted to resolve the issue whether there would be a constitutional
bar to a law prohibiting a discriminatory membership policy. 165
would have made the first amendment applicable, thus limiting the discretion of the shopping
center's corporate owner in determining the use of the property. In concluding that state
action was not involved, the Court saw a need to balance first amendment rights against the
property rights protected by due process:
In addressing this issue, it must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action
by the owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only. The
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are also relevant in this
case. . . . There is the further proscription in the Fifth Amendment against the taking
of 'private property . . . for public use, without just compensation.'
[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property owners, as well as
the First Amendment rights of all citizens must be protected.
407 U.S. at 567-70.
See also Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
162. Commonwealth Human Rel. Comm'n v. Loyal Order of Moose, 294 A.2d 594 (Pa.),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
163. 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
164. "There is, of course, no question that when the lodge leases its facilities to nonmembers, a place of public accommodation exists and the lodge does in fact follow a nondiscriminatory policy in such circumstances. The opening of the facilities to guests of members
is a difference in degree rather than in character, and each constitutes a step beyond the
limited area of immunity granted by the Human Relations Act." 448 Pa. 451, _
294 A.2d
594, 598 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). Justice Douglas's Moose Lodge
dissent noted that Irvis had not argued that the equal protection clause was triggered by the
lodge's role as a center of community activity. Thus the Supreme Court's opinion left this
question open. 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 n.1 (1972).
165. "That is not to say that under the act the lodge may not discriminate in whatever
manner it pleases in determining its qualifications for membership." 448 Pa. at ._ 294 A.2d
at 598.
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C. Conditioning Governmental Benefits on Nondiscrimination
In Green v. Connally,"'6 affirmed summarily by the Supreme
Court,"0 7 a three-judge federal district court held that the Internal
Revenue Code did not accord tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools, nor did it accord charitable deduction status
to gifts made to such schools. The holding rested in part on a desire
to avoid serious constitutional questions that otherwise would have
arisen since the tax exemptions and deductions might be considered
the equivalent of direct federal aid to segregated institutions. 6 ' Noting that "freedom from governmental 'regimentation' or interference is not to be equated with a right of support," ' 9 particularly
where the condition imposed on receipt of the support prohibited
racial discrimination,1 7 the court rejected the argument that
construing the Code to condition favorable tax treatment on nondiscrimination unconstitutionally burdened freedom of association.
The Green court recognized that government interest in the elimination of racial discrimination "stands on the highest constitutional
ground" and dominates other constitutional interests.1 7 Thus when
other constitutional interests-including the fundamental interests
in freedom of association and the right of privacy-collide with the
government's interest in nondiscrimination, the other interests
must give way. However, the court disclaimed any intention to resolve the issue whether the interest in eliminating racial discrimination was sufficiently compelling to justify outright profiibition of
racial discrimination in private schools.172
1 73
the Supreme Court
More recently, in Norwood v. Harrison,
invalidated a state program for lending textbooks to students in
public and private schools because the program failed to impose a
condition of nondiscrimination on private school participation. In
responding to the argument that it would be a denial of equal pro166. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
167. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
168. 330 F. Supp. at 1164-65.
169. Id. at 1166. But see Buchanan, FederalRegulation of PrivateRacial Prejudice:A
Study of Law in Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. RIv. 473, 521-22 (1971).
170. 330 F. Supp. at 1166.
171. "There is a compelling as well as a reasonable government interest in the interdiction of racial discrimination which stands on the highest constitutional ground, taking into
account the provisions and penumbra of the Amendments passed in the wake of the Civil

War. That government interest is dominant over other constitutional interests to the extent
there is a complete and unavoidable conflict." Id. at 1167.
172. Id. at 1168.
173. 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973).
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tection to bar private schools which discriminate on racial grounds
from state assistance, the Court stated:
That the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in some
circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.
[Ailthough the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places no value
on discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the Free Exercise Clause.
Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never
been afforded affirmative constitutional protection.'

Thus, in the case of direct or indirect financial assistance to private
schools, imposition of a requirement of nondiscrimination is mandatory because failure to do so would involve the government in subsidizing racial discrimination and would constitute unconstitutional
state action.
The rights of association and privacy, however, lie on a spectrum and are not equally significant in all cases. 75 Illustrative of this
point is the fact that, although the court in Green stressed that it
left unresolved the issue whether there would be a compelling interest supporting an outright ban on private school discrimination, 17
it relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Railway Mail Association v. Corsi.'77 In Corsi, the Court sustained a state law prohibiting
racial discrimination in union membership or services against a
challenge that the statute violated freedom of association. 178 The
union in Corsi exemplifies a nominally private association in which
a public function predominates. Unions exercise monopoly power by
reason of governmental sufferance, and accordingly, their operation
is subject justifiably to extensive regulation, including a prohibition
of racial discrimination.' 79 Just a year prior to Corsi, the Supreme
Court had, in fact, construed the Railway Labor Act to require that
railroad labor unions conduct themselves in a nondiscriminatory
fashion.'80 Observing that the railroad union was "clothed with
power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitu174. Id. at 2809, 2813.
175. See Note, Developing Legal Vistas for the Discouragement of Private Club
Discrimination,58 IowA L. REv. 108, 135-38 (1972); Note, Private Club Discrimination,supra
note 136, at 601-02
176. 330 F. Supp. at 1166.
177. 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
178. 330 F. Supp. at 1167.
179. See Johnson v. Capital City Lodge No. 74, Fraternal Order of Police, 477 F.2d 601
(4th Cir. 1973).
180. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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tional limitations,"1 8' the Court was concerned in that case, as it was
in Green, with the serious problem of unconstitutional state action
which otherwise would have been present. Illustrating the other side
of the associational rights spectrum, it would not be equally justifiable for the government to prohibit racial discrimination in the
selection of people one invites to one's home. Thus, in McGlotten
v. Connally,12 the court distinguished provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code allowing certain deductions such as home mortgage
interest from those providing tax exemptions for charitable organizations:
The public nature of the activity delegated to the organization in question,
the degree of control the government has retained as to the purposes and
organizations which may benefit, and the aura of Governmental approval inherent in any exempt ruling by the Internal Revenue Service, all serve to
distinguish the benefits at issue from the general run of deductions available
under the Internal Revenue Code."'

These two situations demonstrate that each case requires a weighing
of the rights of association and privacy involved. Recognizing, however, the strong and perhaps atypical public interest in education
and unions, the dissimilar situation of private clubs demands further consideration.
Several decisions have addressed laws that accord tax advantages to private clubs and fraternal orders but do not require a
policy of nondiscrimination. Consequently, these decisions have
confronted the "serious constitutional question" of state action
avoided in Green. In Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, State
of Oregon,'14 the Supreme Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction
an appeal from a three-judge district court decision'85 invalidating
Oregon's granting of tax exemptions to fraternal organizations having racially discriminatory membership policies. The State unsuccessfully argued that the tax exemption was the equivalent of the
liquor license in Moose Lodge and consequently did not constitute
state action. 86 The court distinguished the liquor license situation
as not involving a symbiotic relationship from which both the organization and the state benefit.1 7 In Falkenstein,the state required as
a condition of obtaining tax exempt status that the organization
181. Id. at 198.
182. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
183. Id. at 457.
184.

409 U.S. 1099 (1973).

185. Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972).
186. Id. at 888.
187.

Id.
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engage in benevolent and charitable activities on which the state in
effect placed its seal of approval. 8 8 Another three-judge federal district court, in Pitts v. Department of Revenue for State of
Wisconsin,'5 applied a similar rationale to strike down Wisconsin
tax exemptions granted to racially discriminatory organizations.
Significantly, as in the Green decision, the court emphasized that
this was not a case in which a termination of the actual discriminatory conduct was sought. "Here," the court pointed out, "it is only
the state encouragement which the plaintiffs want eliminated."' 90
Furthermore, the court in Pitts viewed the rights to be balanced as
"a right to equal protection of the laws against a right of certain
organizations to discriminate in their membership on the basis of
race and, in the process, obtain tax exemptions which obviously
encourage their activities, including racial discrimination, by providing indirect financial aid."' 9 '
Falkenstein,Pitts, and McGlotten indicate that, as in the case
of private schools, the balance to be struck favors equal protection.
In Moose Lodge, however, the Supreme Court appears to have
struck a different balance for dealing with private clubs, finding
that the government's liquor licensing procedure did not constitute
sufficient involvement in private activity to warrant a finding of
state action that would require suspension of the license. Nevertheless, even where the Court is unwilling to find state action, there is
considerable merit to the argument that the state is constitutionally
entitled to adopt voluntarily a policy of disassociating itself from
racial discrimination. Imposition of a nondiscrimination condition
upon receipt of a liquor license results in less interference with associational rights than direct regulation. Therefore, it might be proper
for the state to impose such a condition where it could not mandate
nondiscrimination as such. Certainly, the state has a strong interest
in enforcing regulations that prevent the public from concluding
that the state has approved racial discrimination or is contributing
de facto to its support. This result follows from the constitutional
prohibition on the state's actually giving approval or support, 1 2 and
188. Id. at 889.
189. 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
190. Id. at 666.
191. Id. at 669.
192. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967). Conditioning the retention
of a liquor license on curtailment of the right of free speech, as in LaRue, generally would
not have this justification. A possible exception concerns a regulation attempting to condition
such retention on observance of a prohibition on "racist" entertainment in night clubs.
Compare Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (sustaining a group libel statute making
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provides a valid line of reasoning that explains the Court's refusal
to hear the appeal in Igraham. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that
deference to state power under the twenty-first amendment was a
factor in the Court's action." 3
CONCLUSION

A thorough understanding of LaRue is essential in order to
avoid further undesirable reliance on its twenty-first amendment
rationale. The Court's focus on this amendment can be best understood as a temporary expedient only slightly camouflaging a movement toward a narrower definition of expression protected by the
first amendment. Unfortunately, that camouflage has produced
considerable confusion concerning the relationship of the twentyfirst amendment to constitutional safeguards of individual rights.
The emerging danger of LaRue is that it may be viewed as sanctioning further impingement on individual rights whenever there is
any tangential connection with the twenty-first amendment. The
Supreme Court's dismissal in Ingrahamand its remands in Peto and
Bruno may encourage this view.
criminal the dissemination of material disparaging as a class citizens of any race, color, creed,
or religion), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (reversing conviction of a Ku Klux
Klan leader arising out of a racist and antisemetic speech). This situation is somewhat
comparable to the hypothetical case posed but not resolved in Green as to "whether taxexemption or tax-deduction status may be available to a religious school that practices acts
of racial restriction because of the requirments of religion." 330 F. Supp. at 1169. See also
Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3175
(Oct. 9, 1973) (No. 72-1470). The answer to the Green hypothetical is likely to be no. See
Norwood v. Harrison, supra note 171, at 2810, n.7. Nevertheless, the actual and apparent
government support and approval is stronger in the case of the tax benefits.
193. The state of Maine's memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the Elk's
appeal relied in part on the argument that the twenty-first amendment, as interpreted in
LaRue, augmented the state's regulatory power. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at
7-8, B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924 (1973). It should be noted that
Justice Douglas's dissent from the dismissal was solely on the basis of equal protection and
ignored the large portion of the appeal addressed to alleged infringement of the rights of
association and privacy. 411 U.S. at 926-28. In Moose Lodge, however, these rights were of
such great concern to him that he would have concurred with the majority except for the fact
that the Pennsylvania liquor licenses were issued only in limited numbers and thus created
a state sanctioned monopoly in which all citizens have an interest. 407 U.S. at 182. The Elks
Lodge in Ingraham, however, enjoyed no such monopolistic position since additional liquor
licenses readily could be obtained. Telephone interview with Charles Larouche, Assistant
Attorney General of Maine, Sept. 14, 1973. Therefore, Justice Douglas was confronted with
the Moose Lodge situations minus the state approved monopolization of liquor distribution-a situation in which the rights of association and privacy would seem to predominate.
Yet Justice Douglas did not even mention these rights in his Ingraham dissent. Since LaRue
occurred between Moose Lodge and Ingraham, it stands out as one possible explanation for
Justice Douglas's abandonment of the associational and privacy arguments.
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Approaching LaRue from a broader perspective, it is ironic
that, in the term in which it and the obscenity decisions were rendered, the Court in Roe v. Wade194 engaged in the most far reaching
overriding of state police power since Lochner.95 Significantly, even
though the Wade result limited drastically the state's power in an
important area of social concern,' 96 the result was accomplished
solely by reason of the Court's unsupported impressions of due process. In the area of obscenity control, however, the Court was willing
to constrict the right of free speech-a right specifically guaranteed
as a fundamental principle of our political system. The twenty-first
amendment rationale for such constriction was aberrational and
should not provide a future basis for sustaining otherwise unconstitutional state interference with individual rights.
194. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
195. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2661-62
(1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ. dissenting).
196. 410 U.S. at 153. See also id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring).

